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Abstract—In the smart grid, an integrated distributed authentication protocol is needed to not only securely manage the system but
also efficiently authenticate many different entities for the smart grid communications. In addition, a lightweight authentication protocol
is required to handle frequent authentications among billions of devices. Unfortunately, in the literature, there is no such integrated
protocol that provides mutual authentications among the home environment, energy provider, gateways, and advanced metering
infrastructure network. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a lightweight cloud trusted authorities-based integrated (centrally
controlled) distributed authentication protocol that provides mutual authentications among various communicated entities in a
distributed manner. Based on certificateless cryptography, our protocol is lightweight and efficient even if there are invalid requests
contained a batch. Security and performance analysis show that the protocol provides privacy preservation, forward secrecy, semantic
security, perfect key ambiguous, and protection against identity thefts while generating lower overheads in comparison with the existing
protocols. Also, the protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks, redirection attacks, impersonation attacks, and
denial-of-service attacks. Moreover, our protocol provides a complete resistance against the flood-based denial-of-service attacks in
the smart grid.
Index Terms—Authentication, Smart grid, DoS attacks, Redirection attacks, Cloud computing.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE smart grid (SG) is a critical infrastructure, whoseobjective is to provide more efficient, secure, stable,
and reliable power to consumers, operators, and utilities.
The SG system for home environment consists of various
components such as smart meters (SM), home appliances
(HA), energy providers (EP), gateways (GW), and advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) network. It is generally as-
sumed that home area network (HAN) is wirelessly con-
nected with the Zigbee technology [1], whereas the building
area network (BAN)/neighborhood area network (NAN)
is connected by wide area network (WAN) technologies
and cellular technologies, such as global system for mobile
communication (GSM) and long term evolution (LTE) [2].
Smart meters can be considered to be equipped with two
communication interfaces, where one interface works as a
SM and the other works as a HAN-GW. Therefore, the SM
is a central home controller that communicates with all the
HA within a household. Further, BAN-GW/NAN-GW acts
as (or deploy) an aggregator (AG) that receives data from
the SM and forwards it to the respective control center
(CC) via relays and concentrators with via wired/wireless
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connections. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the
SG system.
Fig. 1: Overall architecture of the smart grid system.
Two-way communications in the SG enable instant in-
teraction between different SG entities and help to improve
the overall efficiency of the SG system. However, without
proper authentications, the system resources and entities
can be compromised that may result in financial losses
and performance degradation [3], [4]. Therefore, in the SG
system, an integrated, distributed, fast, and lightweight
authentication protocol is needed to provide mutual authen-
tications between the various entities of the SG system. An
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integrated distributed protocol can maximize the utilization
of shared resources while generating low overhead. In the
SG system, a fast and lightweight protocol is required as the
authentication process is frequently repeated many times
among billions of devices. Further, the security protocol of
the SG system must provide defense against the known
security attacks, including man-in-the-middle (MITM) and
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [5]. According to the NIST
reports, one of the main security issues in the SG system is
that the authentication mechanism does not sufficiently au-
thenticate devices or exposes authentication keys. Therefore,
a centralized authentication in decentralized environment is
required for the centralized security management in terms
of event logging/analysis and authentication [6], [7].
There are many different communication protocols used
for delivering various commands and control information.
These protocols were not designed initially with security
in mind. Today, when Internet is connected to the SG sys-
tem, various organizations, such as ETSI, IEEE, and NIST
are embedding security to the existing protocols as new
standards in order to prevent the system against various
well known security attacks. However, they need to modify
many communication standards for making them security
embedded. This creates additional overheads. Furthermore,
researchers have not yet focused much on an integrated
protocol, rather they have proposed separate protocols for
individual connections between different entities in the SG.
They have not discussed the integration of these protocols
for compatible communication among them. This motivates
us to propose such an efficient and secure authentication
protocol for the SG system. However, there are several chal-
lenges in designing an integrated distributed authentication
protocol as we identified below:
• The protocol should not only be controlled by a
central entity, but also by the subsystems of the SG
network in a distributed manner.
• Embedding security solutions in each communica-
tion protocol of the SG network not only are highly
complex but also generate huge overhead and cost.
Therefore, it would be more flexible and efficient
to instead design a cyber-security layer over the
communication network to maintain end-to-end se-
curity [8]. This simplifies the integration at the cyber-
security layer, rather than integrating different com-
munication protocols in the SG network.
• The protocol should be able to fully utilize the avail-
able system resources.
• The generated overhead by the protocol should be
as low as possible. The protocol should be fast
and lightweight, as the authentication process is fre-
quently repeated many times among billions of de-
vices, especially, when devices receive multiple mes-
sages at once, such as when gateways/aggregators
authenticate multiple smart meters and gather data
from them.
• The protocol must utilize the suitable cryptosystem
(with symmetric and/or asymmetric keys) as recom-
mended by various standard organizations, such as
IEEE, ETSI, and NIST. Particularly, NIST report [6]
emphasizes the issues of key exchange in symmetric
key cryptography and the public key infrastructure
(PKI) in asymmetric key cryptography. Hence, key
management issue must be considered in the design
of the protocol.
• The protocol should enable consumers to have the
security control over his/her home, i.e., control over
all the home appliances with the smart meter.
• The protocol must support secure communication
over the network with strong encryption. Moreover,
the identity of each device should be protected over
the network to maintain identity anonymity and
untraceability.
• The protocol must be able to defeat various well-
known security attacks, such as MITM attacks, redi-
rection attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks,
and flood-based DoS attacks.
1.1 Research Problem
There are several challenges with the current authentica-
tion protocols in terms of efficiency, overhead, cost, delay,
privacy, and etc. Also, many vulnerabilities do exist in the
available authentication schemes of various communication
protocols for the SG, such as weak encryption and message
digest in the OSGP protocol, security issues in the DNP3
protocol (even in version 5), etc. There is not yet an in-
tegrated distributed authentication protocol that provides
mutual authentications between the home environment
(HA, SM, HAN-GW), energy provider, gateways (BAN-GW,
NAN-GW), and AMI network (SM, aggregator/collector,
CC). An integrated protocol can provide a common plat-
form for authenticating various devices while efficiently
maximizing the utilization of shared resources with low
overhead in the SG system. Also, the privacy protection in
the SG system is an important requirement, so the protocol
must not reveal the confidential and private information
related to any entity involved in the authentication process.
Therefore, an end user (consumer) should have a control
over his/her own home environment, such as HA, since
data generated and being sent belong to a particular user.
Furthermore, the protocol must be fast and efficient, and
should be able to defeat known security attacks.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we design an integrated distributed proto-
col for the SG network, which meets all aforementioned
challenges discussed in the previous subsection. Note that
the proposed protocol may not be suitable for some parts
of the SG system with very low communication latency
requirements, such as for the generic object oriented substa-
tion event (GOOSE) and sampled measured values (SMV)
layer-2 messages within the substation. Here, messages
are not encrypted due to the transmission requirements
within 4 milliseconds (ms). In such scenarios, a virtual LAN
(VLAN) with layer-2 capabilities can be used with signed
authenticated values [16], or a simple lightweight protocol
can be designed for the authentication with integrity, but
without encryption. Our new SG authentication protocol
has following features:
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• Provides mutual authentications between the EP and
the SM, between the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-
GW/NAN-GW, between the SM and the HA, and
between the NAN-GW and the CC.
• Provides a secure solution for the consumers to
choose or change the energy provider of their own
choice. The protocol provides more satisfaction to
the consumer as he/she will have the control over
its HA (secured with a password shared between the
SM and all the HA and only he/she can change it).
• Defeats various security attacks: defeats the flood-
based DoS attacks targeting transmitted messages
between the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-GW/NAN-
GW; protects the SM and the EP from redirection
attacks as Zip codes are verified at both ends; pre-
serves the privacy of each message as it is encrypted
before being transmitted over the network; provides
resistances against ID thefts, MITM attacks, replay
attacks, brute-force attacks, repudiation attacks, and
impersonation attacks.
• Lightweight in terms of communication and com-
putation overheads. The execution time of 3.96 s
in Java can be considered fast, as it is for all the
involved entities in the SG network and is within
the requirements (few minutes) set by the standards
[6].
• Uses the cloud-based trusted authorities (TA) for key
management, which does not have the key exchange
or PKI issues. Instead, the TA generates partial public
and private keys, and the legitimate device generates
its actual public and private keys.
1.3 Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses the related work and Section 3 presents our SG
system model. A new authentication protocol is proposed
in Section 4. Security and performance analysis is presented
in Section 5, including a formal proof of the protocol. Section
6 presents the conclusion of this work.
Table 1 summarizes various symbols and abbreviations
used in the paper along with their descriptions and sizes.
Note that the sizes of public and private keys may depend
upon the algorithm used in asymmetric encryption.
2 RELATED WORK
We first discuss the standardized protocols in SG along with
their limitations. Then, we will present existing authentica-
tion protocols that provide authentications between various
entities with lower overhead, and then those that provide
protection against various security attacks and preserves the
privacy in the SG.
There are some standardized protocols available in the
literature for the SG, which support authentication process,
such as open smart grid protocol (OSGP) for the smart
meters, distributed network protocol (DNP3) between the
control center and the substations, device language message
specification/companion specification for energy metering
(DLMS/COSEM) for the AMI network, and OpenADR for
the demand response program. In addition, some standard-
ized authentication protocols also support authentication,
TABLE 1: Symbols And Abbreviations
Symbol Description Size (bits)
H1()/H2() Hash functions used in ciphering —
H3() Hash function for SK key generation —
H3change () Hash function for changing the password —
h() Hash function for computing e —
ID Identity of the entity 128
e Hash value 128
MAC Message authentication code 64
PUK Public key 160
PRK Private key 160
SK Shared secret key 256
T Timestamp 64
K Random number 128
Zip Postal code 128
S Signature 128
pwd Password shared between SM and HAs 128
Z Sum of products of K and ID 128
P Sum of products of PRK and ID 128
R Sum of products of S and ID 128
such as remote authentication dial-in user service (RADIUS)
and Diameter protocols for the 2G, 3G, and 4G cellular
networks [9].
The OSGP protocol, which was developed by energy ser-
vice network association (ESNA) and is a standard of the Eu-
ropean telecommunications standards institute (ETSI), was
deployed for providing the authentication and confidential
security to the SG applications. This protocol is expected
to provide reliable and efficient delivery of command and
control information between the smart meters, direct load
control modules, gateways, and other SG devices. However,
recently, researchers from Germany easily recovered private
encryption keys of the smart meters in a system following
OSGP without a significant computational effort [10]. Also, a
number of attacks has been performed over the OSGP proto-
col [11], including one with just 13 queries to a homegrown
message authentication code (OMA digest) oracle, and by
which the protocol further failed to deliver authenticity
guarantee and confidentiality (due to using a non-standard
composition of RC4 as weak encryption algorithm) [10].
Similar security issues were found in the DNP3 protocol,
which does not provide authentication, message integrity,
and confidentiality. In 2012, a new version of the DNP3
protocol, named DNP3 secure authentication version 5, was
announced, which provides methods to remotely change
user update keys using either symmetric or asymmetric
cryptography [12]. However, it considers only spoofing,
modification, and replay attacks over the network, and does
not provide confidentiality of the message. Also version 5
of the protocol is not backwards compatible with previous
versions, which may add a heavy protocol replacement cost.
Furthermore, the authentication supports provided by
DLMS/COSEM, OpenADR, RADIUS, and Diameter are not
sufficient and some of these are also very costly [9].
The DLMS (application layer communication protocol) and
COSEM (data model), together provide an interface model
for metering applications belonging to IEC 62056 stan-
dards, such as electricity [13]. Basically, there are three
authentication options in DLMS/COSEM, i.e., no security,
low level security authentication where server identifies
client by a password, and high level security authentication
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(mutual identification) with exchange challenges. However,
the DLMS/COSEM’s security services are restricted to use
symmetric key encryption. In practice, smart meters need
asymmetric key to be used in secure socket layer/transport
layer security (TLS/SSL), but DLMS/COSEM does not sup-
port TLS/SSL. In demand response, OpenADR, which is a
standard development effort, supports authentication based
on public key cryptography with exchange of certificates
[14]. This standard maintains a hierarchy of certified au-
thorities and requires a PKI to use three-tier PKI technology,
which ultimately results in high development cost.
RADIUS is commonly used protocol to provide remote
user authentication and accounting in cellular networks,
and WLAN interworking and Wi-Fi offload situations [15].
It provides centralized services using a central database.
However, the SG requires decentralized solutions, as a
single-point-of-failure can massively affect the centralized
system. RADIUS implementation supports peer authentica-
tion between communication endpoints using a pre-shared
key. Hence, it brings some key management issues and is
not suitable for large systems, such as the SG. Furthermore,
RADIUS has poor scalability and uses the user datagram
protocol (UDP), which does not provide reliable data trans-
fer. Therefore, it is not suitable for the SG where the avail-
ability of information is extremely important. On the other
hand, Diameter protocol is an authentication, authorization,
and accounting protocol used in networking, which sup-
ports transmission control protocol (TCP) instead of UDP.
However, its supported capabilities are sometimes more
expansive. Furthermore, RADIUS and Diameter protocols
do not directly protect against DoS attacks carried out by
flooding the target equipment with bogus traffic.
For providing low overhead, a lightweight authenti-
cation scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol and a hash-based message authentication code
(HMAC) was proposed in [1]. However, it provides mutual
authentication only between the HAN-GW and the BAN-
GW. Sule et al. [17] made a change in [1] by using a MAC
between the AMI devices and the controller nodes instead
of HMAC. Although this scheme reduces the verification
time, it also reduces the protocol security provided by the
function. As in [1], the scheme only involves the HAN-
GW and the BAN-GW communication. Further, an authen-
tication scheme using a batch signatures verification was
proposed in [18]. However, the scheme does not focus on
authentication among SM, HAN, and HA, rather authenti-
cating data aggregation. A key agreement protocol for SG
is proposed in [19], which reduces the number of hash
functions used and the delay caused by the security process.
Recently, an identity-based scheme is proposed to provide
authentication between the SM and the AS, and reduce
the total number of exchanged packets, but increases the
computation overhead [20].
Many researchers have proposed solutions in order to re-
sist against different attacks in the SG system, such as replay,
MITM, impersonation, and DoS. However, in the absence of
authentication, an attacker can easily tamper the message
and/or can send a fake message. In this direction, a mutual
authentication scheme between the SM and the data concen-
tration unit (DCU) was proposed to prevent impersonation,
and MITM attacks [21]. However, this scheme neither dis-
cusses the generated overhead nor provides authentication
in a home environment. Recently, an authentication scheme
using a Merkle hash tree technique was proposed to pre-
vent replay, injection and message modification attacks [22].
However, communication only between the HAN and the
NAN is considered. A Diffie-Hellman-based secure aggrega-
tion scheme for collecting data was presented in [23], which
generates lower computation and communication overhead,
but it does not consider SM’s authentication. Metke et al. [24]
stated that a strong authentication technique is required for
all users and devices within the SG network. It is expected
that in the near future, due to the increase in the number of
devices, the current protocols may not be scalable.
In addition, the privacy of the customers in terms
of power usage, billing, and other information must be
preserved during the authentication. In this direction, an
identity-based authentication protocol is proposed to pro-
vide source authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation
services, and privacy preservation in AMI [25]. However, it
does not consider overhead and efficiency. Yan et al. [26] pro-
posed an integrated authentication and confidentiality (IAC)
protocol that provides a mutual authentication between
the SM and the AMI network, and enables data privacy,
integrity, and confidentiality. However, it generates a huge
overhead as it performs several encryption/decryption op-
erations. Further, it does not consider EP and HA entities in
their authentication system.
In summary, several standard, lightweight, and privacy-
preserved protocols have been proposed by researchers.
However, the existing standard protocols do not provide
sufficient security and privacy preservation to the SG sys-
tem. Also, many existing protocols (including privacy-
preserved) are inefficient and generate huge overheads. Fur-
thermore, the existing lightweight and privacy-preserved
protocols are with limited capability of authenticating only
few entities (mostly two devices) in the smart grid. In other
words, these protocols do not enable authentications among
all the entities with optimized resource utilization. More-
over, embedding security to the existing protocols generate
huge overheads and requires integration to authenticate all
the entities of the SG network, which results in inefficient
and costly solution. Therefore, there is a need of an in-
tegrated lightweight authentication protocol that provides
mutual authentications from end-to-end and protects the
SG system from known attacks and keeping the privacy
preserved. We tackle this problem in the paper.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
Currently, in the SG system, security operations are done
independently by each center. However, due to the limited
processing capability, they do not support online analysis
and generate high maintenance cost [27]. Further, the SG
requires a powerful platform with effective integration and
ubiquitous seamless access to collect and analyze huge data
collected from a variety of sources such as AMI, wide area
measurement system (WAMS), and HA. Recent studies [28],
[29], [30], [31] show that cloud computing is very much
compatible with the SG system because of its several ad-
vantages, including energy efficiency, flexibility, scalability,
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Fig. 2: Hierarchy of trusted authorities.
agility, and cost effectiveness. Various researchers have pro-
posed their solutions by integrating cloud computing in the
SG system. Baek et al. [29] designed a big data information
management framework, called Smart-Frame, based on a
cloud computing model. Also, Jiang et al. [32] proposed
a scheme for searchable encryption on the cloud database
in the SG, and Bitzer et al. [33] presented the feasibility
study of monitoring renewable energy in the SG based
on a cloud computing framework retaining SG security.
Developing a secure cloud network is not our goal in this
paper. However, we consider that our scheme uses secure
cloud servers as discussed in [29], [32], and [33]. We employ
the cloud computing into our SG system, particularly [29],
which builds a hierarchical structure of cloud computing
centers. Employing cloud computing in smart grids, not
only addresses the issue of large information management,
but also provides a high energy and cost saving platform.
A roadmap in [34] presents a realistic example of deploying
cloud computing centers in the SG system.
We propose to have a cyber-security layer on the top of
communication protocols layer that takes care the security
issues existing in the communication between any two
entities over the network. Our SG system is divided into
several regions/areas, each of which is managed by either
a public or private, but secure cloud computing center [29].
As shown in Figure 2, we consider three different tiers in
our SG system as follows:
• Tier-1: Central cloud computing center
• Tier-2: Distributed cloud computing centers
• Tier-3: SMs, GWs, and EPs
As shown in Fig. 2, there are n distributed cloud com-
puting centers, also called trusted authorities (TAs). Each
TA manages a region that includes various SMs, GWs, and
EPs. The tier-1 TA provides inter-TA communication among
different entities within the system, while the tier-2 TAs
are responsible for managing the public key repository, and
generating partial public and private keys of devices at their
ends. The main purpose of enabling cloud environment
in our SG system is to provide an easy and fast access
to the public key repository and to efficiently generate
public and private key pairs. In addition, the SG requires
a powerful computing platform to handle a large scale
data analysis and to support complex real-time application
services. In each TA, various cloud computing services can
be deployed, such as infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) for SG
information collection, processing, and storage, platform-
as-a-service (PaaS) for developing and integrating cloud
computing specific security-based applications for the SG
environment, and software-as-a-service (SaaS) for specific
services such as optimization of energy usage.
4 PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
This section proposes an authentication protocol for the SG
system. We first present an overview of our protocol, then
present mutual authentication approaches between different
SG entities. The authentications between EP-SM, SM-GW,
and SM-HA are based on asymmetric key cryptography,
asymmetric key cryptography in batch, and symmetric key
cryptography, respectively.
4.1 Overview
Recently, identity-based cryptography (IBC) is considered to
be a good platform for securing grid and cloud computing
environments [35], [36]. However, IBC suffers from the
key escrow problem [37]. Therefore, our protocol is based
on a certificateless cryptosystem, which is a combination
of identity-based cryptography and traditional public key
cryptography [38]. Our approach not only overcomes the
key escrow problem in IBC, but also does not require tradi-
tional PKI that is costly due to the private key generation
(PKG) in IBC. We instead use a key generation center (KGC).
The security of our scheme is based on the elliptic curve dis-
crete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for the group of points on
an elliptic curve over a finite field under elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC). Here, we let E be an elliptic curve defined
over a finite field Fp as E : y2 = x3 + Ax + B;A,B ∈ Fp.
Let E1 and E2 be points in E(Fp) and integer x is found
such that E1 = xE2. The best known algorithm to solve
the ECDLP is exponential, which is not enough to break its
security. We do not design a pairing based scheme under
ECC, but design a certificateless-based asymmetric encryp-
tion scheme. This is because the multiplication of points
under ECC is more efficient than the pairing operation. For
instance, it takes 0.6 ms for point multiplication and 4.5
ms for a pairing operation under a same setting [39]. The
identity (ID) of each device (EP, SM, GW, HA) in the SG
network is taken from a random point on the elliptic curve
over E(Fq).
Each TA generates its private and public key pair, known
as a master private key and a master public key, and makes
the public key available to its users. Our approach is simpler
than the Diffie-Hellman protocol, as it uses one-way hash
functions instead of exponential functions. The KGC (at each
TA) supplies an entity with a partial private key and a
partial public key. We assume that the KGC securely delivers
the partial keys to the intended entities. The entity then
combines its partial public and private keys with secret
information to generate its actual private and public keys.
In this way, the entity’s private key is not known to the KGC
and the anonymity of the user’s public key is also achieved.
This anonymity is useful, when we consider that in order
to receive the public key of a device, the requested device
must be verified authentic to the TA using its partial key
credentials.
First, we present generic definitions of various algo-
rithms used in our scheme, and then explain each of these
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algorithms in detail.
Definition 1. A generic certificateless public key encryption
scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup: The KGC generates a common public parame-
ter (param) and a master secret key (masterKey), and
uses these keys to generate different keys.
• PartialKeyGeneration: TA uses param, masterKey and an
identity ID (a point of elliptic curve group) received
from a user to generate a partial private key (PPR)
and a partial public key (PPU) as (PPU, PPR) =
PartialKeyExtract (param, masterKey, ID).
• SecretValue: User/device uses param and ID to gener-
ate a secret value sID = SecretValue(param, ID).
• GenPrivateKey: User/device uses param, PPR, and
sID to generate private key PRK as PRK = GenPri-
vateKey(param, PPR, sID).
• GenPublicKey: User/device uses param, PPU, sID and
ID to generate public key PUK as PUK = GenPub-
licKey(param, PPU, sID, ID).
• Encrypt: The plaintext M is encrypted using param
and PUK to generate a ciphertext C as C = En-
crypt(param, PUK, M ).
• Decrypt: The ciphertext C is decrypted using param
and PRK to retrieve the plaintext M as M = De-
crypt(param, PRK, C).
The public key of each entity is available in a public
repository of the corresponding tier-2 cloud computing cen-
ter (TA). The private keys are kept secret and stored on the
SMs, the GWs, and the EPs. Since each entity is registered to
a specific TA, it knows the identity and the public key of the
TA. The details of generating different keys are as follows:
• Setup: t ← Z∗q is a random integer with large prime
q, and P is a generator of a large cyclic group G over
E(Fq). Each TA generates its private and public key
pair as (PRKTA = t, PUKTA = tP) . Let us define the
hash functions used in this protocol as H1 : Z∗q →
{0, 1}∗, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and H3 : Z∗q × Z∗q →
{0, 1}∗. Returns param = (q, P , PUKTA, H1, H2, H3)
and masterKey = (q, P , PRKTA, H1, H2, H3).
• PartialKeyGeneration: TA chooses a random s ∈ Z∗q
and computes w = sP and x = s + PRKTAH1(ID).
Note that the ID is first converted from a elliptic
curve point to a bit string [40] in H1() and then
hashed. Returns (PPU, PPR) = (w, x).
• SecretValue: Each device chooses a random z ∈ Z∗q .
Returns sID = z.
• GenPrivateKey: Each device computes its private key
PRK = (sID, PPR) = (z, x). Returns PRK.
• GenPublicKey: Each device computes its public key
PUK = (PPU, sID, ID) = (w, v), where v = zP. Returns
PUK.
• Encrypt: Sender device computes r = H2(M ||γ),
where M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a plaintext and γ ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Furthermore, it computes ciphertext C = (c1, c2, c3)
such that c1 = rP; c2 = rv +M ||γ; c3 = w + u;
where u = PUKTAH1(ID). Returns C .
• Decrypt: Receiver device first applies partial private
key by computing Ver1 = c3 − xP. If Ver1 = 0, it pro-
ceeds further, otherwise terminates the connection.
Thereafter, it retrieves the message M ||γ as c2 − zc1
and verifies Ver2 as H2(M ||γ)P ?= c1. Returns M .
4.2 Authentication between the EP and the SM
We assume that EP knows the identity of each SM that it
supplies the electricity to. Similarly, each SM also knows
the identity of its EP, as it has a contract with the EP. As
shown in Figure 3, the authentication between the EP and
the SM/HAN-GW is carried out as follows:
Step-1 EP→SM:[EPUKSM {IDEP ,K1, ZipEP }, T1,
MAC1]: First, the EP retrieves the public key of the
SM from the repository stored at its tier-2, i.e., PUKSM .
Then, it encrypts its identity IDEP , a nonce K1, and
the location (Zip code) ZipEP with the public key of
the SM and sends it to the SM along with a current
timestamp T1 and a MAC1 (message-1), where MAC1 =
[EPUKSM {IDEP ,K1, ZipEP }, T1]. We consider each MAC
as a HMAC function, i.e., HMACSHA256, and a pre-assigned
key, say K , is used in MAC.
Step-2 SM→EP:[EPUKEP {IDSM ,K2, ZipSM}, T2,
MAC2]: On receiving message-1, the SM computes MAC
′
1




1. If it is true, the SM decrypts
the message using its private key. Then, the SM retrieves
the public key of the EP (PUKEP ) and verifies the identity
and the location of the EP. If it is true, then the SM
sends IDSM , K2, ZipSM encrypted with PUKEP to the
EP along with T2 and MAC2 (message-2), where MAC2 =
[EPUKEP {IDSM ,K2, ZipSM}, T2].
Step-3: On receiving message-2, the EP computes MAC
′
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2. If it is true, the EP decrypts
the received message using its private key, and verifies the
identity and the location of the SM. If both are correct, the
EP computes a secret shared key as SK1 = H3(ZipEP ⊕
K2, ZipSM ⊕K1) and sends message to the SM encrypted
with this shared key. Here, H3() is a one-way hash function.
Similarly, the SM also computes the same secret SK1 key.
4.3 Authentication between the SM and the GW
We assume that a group of SM sends its metering data to
a specific GW. The GW keeps a record of the identity of
each SM associated with it. A number of SM communicates
with a GW simultaneously, so the mutual authentication










EPUK-SM {IDEP, K1, ZipEP}, T1, MAC1 
EPUK-EP {IDSM, ZipSM, K2}, T2, MAC2 
ESK1{msg} 
computes & compares 
MAC1’ ?= MAC1, 
checks IDEP, ZipEP 
computes & compares 
MAC2’ ?= MAC2, 
checks IDSM, ZipSM 
computes SK1=  
H3(ZipEPK2, ZipSMK1) 
computes SK1=  
H3(ZipEPK2, ZipSMK1) 
Fig. 3: Authentication between the EP and the SM.











EPUK-GW {IDSMi, Zi}, T3i, MAC3i 
EPUK-SMi {IDGW, e}, T4i, MAC4i 
EPUK-GW {IDSMi, PSMi, SSMi}, T5i, MAC5i 
verifies             
MAC4i’ ?= MAC4i, 
checks IDGW 
verifies         
MAC3i’ ?= MAC3i, 
checks IDSMi 
MAC5i’ ?= MAC5i, 
checks IDSMi, 
stores PSMi, SSMi 
Fig. 4: Authentication between the SM and the BAN/NAN-
GW.
the communication scenario of the proposed authentication
scheme between a group of SMs and the GW are shown in
Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. As shown in Figure 4,
the authentication process is carried out as follows:
Step-1 SMi→GW:[EPUKGW {IDSMi , Zi}, T3i ,MAC3i ]:
First, each SMi retrieves the identity and the public key
of the GW. Then, each SMi sends its identity and Zi
encrypted with PUKGW along with its current timestamp
T3i and MAC3i to the GW (message-1), where MAC3i =
[EPUKGW {IDSMi , Zi}, T3i ] and Zi = IDSMiKi. The Ki ∈
[1, q-1] are the random secret values selected by each SMi.
Step-2 GW→SMi:[EPUKSMi {IDGW , e}, T4i ,MAC4i ]:
On receiving message-1, the GW computes MAC
′
3i and
checks message integrity. If it is true, the GW compares its
current timestamp tm with Tthreshold = T3i + , where  is
the maximum allowed delay to transmit the message to the
GW. If tm > Tthreshold, the request is discarded and the
connection is terminated. Otherwise, the GW decrypts the
message using its private key, and verifies the identity of
the SMi. If it is true, the GW checks the number of attempts
by the SMi within a specified interval. If it is more than the
assigned limit, the connection is terminated. Otherwise, the
GW sends its identity and a value e encrypted using the
public key of the corresponding SMi along with T4i and






Checks Tthreshold = T3i + Ɛ  
Permits limited number 
of attempts by each SM in 
a specific duration
…
Fig. 5: Communication scenario between a group of SMs
and the GW.
way hash function, Z =
∑n
i=1 Zi, and n is the number of
SMi communicating with the GW.
Step-3 SMi→GW:[EPUKGW {IDSMi , PSMi , SSMi}, T5i ,
MAC5i ]: On receiving message-2, each SMi computes
MAC
′
4i and verifies the integrity of each message. If it is true,
SMi decrypts the messages using private keys PRKSMi , and
verifies the received identity of the GW. If it is true, each SMi
stores e, and generates a variable PSMi = PRKSMi IDSMi and
a signature SSMi = (Ki + ePRKSMi ) mod n. Note that the
first 128 bits of PPRKSMi are used in PSMi and SSMi for op-
erations’ compatibility. Then, each SMi sends IDSMi , PSMi ,
and SSMi encrypted using public key of the GW along
with T5i and MAC5i = [EPUKGW {IDSMi , PSMi , SSMi}, T5i ]
(message-3) to the GW. On receiving message-3, the GW
computes MAC
′
5i and checks message integrity. If it is true,
the GW decrypts the messages, and verifies the identity of
each SMi. In a scenario where a group of SMi communicates
with a GW, it is possible that some of them perform flood-
based DoS attacks instead of sending message-3. In order to
prevent these attacks, the identity of each SMi is verified.
For each unresponsive SMi, the GW removes the corre-
sponding Zi and re-computes Z . Then, the GW computes
P =
∑n
i=1 PSMi and R =
∑n
i=1 SSMiIDSMi , and verifies
(R - eP ?= Z).
Therefore, our scheme is efficient even with the presence
of invalid requests in a batch since the GW only needs to
re-compute Z , which is simply a summation of all Zi.
4.4 Authentication between the HA and the SM
Since data generated and sent by all the HA belong to a
particular user, we involve the end user (owner) for authen-
ticating the home appliances (at the initial setup) [41]. The
energy consumption information can reveal personal details
of the consumers, such as their daily routines (including
times when they are at home or asleep), what electronic
equipment they own and are being used, etc. Consumers
expect that the privacy of this information is maintained.
We assume that the SM and all the HA share a password
selected by the user. A secret key SK2 = H3(pwd, T ) is
generated every time a HA and the SM communicates,
where pwd is the shared password, T is a timestamp, and
H3 is a one-way hash function. As shown in Figure 6,
the authentication process between the HA and the SM is





TIDHA, T6, MAC6 
TIDSM, T7, MAC7 
ESK2{msg} 
TIDHA = ESK2{IDHA} MAC6 ?= MAC6’; IDHA = DSK2{TIDHA} 
MAC7 ?= MAC7’; 
IDSM = DSK2{TIDSM} TIDSM = ESK2{IDSM} 
Fig. 6: Authentication between the HA and the SM.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, XXX XXXX 8
Step-1 HA→SM:[TIDHA, T6,MAC6]: First, each HA
generates SK2 from a shared password and uses it to
encrypt the original identity of the HA. Then, it sends a
temporary identity TIDHA, a timestamp T6, and MAC6 to
the SM (message-1), where MAC6 = [TIDHA, T6] and SK2
= H3(pwd, T6). The encryption can be performed by any
standard symmetric key algorithm such as AES-CTR or
MAES-CTR [42].
Step-2 SM→HA:[TIDSM , T7,MAC7]: On receiving
message-1, the SM verifies MAC
′
6 with the received MAC6. If
it is true, the SM decrypts and recovers the actual identity of
the HA. If the identity belongs to one of its HA, it generates
a temporary identity TIDSM and sends its identity to the
HA along with T7 and MAC7 (message-2), where MAC7 =
[TIDSM , T7].
On receiving message-2, the HA computes MAC
′
7 and
compares it with MAC7, and further decrypts and recovers
the actual identity of the SM. If it is correct, the HA and
the SM can start communicating using messages encrypted
by SK2. Moreover, the password can be automatically
changed at a regular interval by calculating pwdi+1 =
N × H3change(d × pwdi), where N is the number of days,
d is a random secret, and H3change is a hash function. For
the password change, the user needs to provide N to the
SM. When, a new password is generated at SM, the SM
encrypts it using last session key and sends it to all the HA
before discarding the previous key.
4.5 Authentication between the NAN-GW and the CC
We assume that the NAN-GW aggregates the received data
from various SM. The CC is assumed to be connected to
the NAN-GW using wired network and is authenticated. In
case, if it is wireless connected, the scenario similar to EP-
SM provides mutual authentication.
5 SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section presents the verification proofs, defenses
against various security attacks, and security and perfor-
mance analysis of our protocol in comparison with the
existing lightweight protocols.
5.1 Verification Proof
We present the verification proofs for the public decryption
of our public encryption scheme, and the correctness of the
protocol between SMs and their corresponding GW.
1. Verification of Decryption in Our Encryption Scheme:
V er1 = c3 − xP
= w + u− xP
= sP + PUKTAH1(ID)− [s+ PRKTAH1(ID)]P
= sP + PRKTAH1(ID)P − sP − PRKTAH1(ID)P
= 0.
V er2 = H2(M ||γ)P ?= c1
= H2(M ||γ)P ?= rP
= H2(M ||γ)P ?= H2(M ||γ)P.






= IDSM1K1 + IDSM2K2 + ...+ IDSMnKn.
R.H.S. = R− eP
= (SSM1IDSM1 + SSM2IDSM2 + ...+ SSMn
IDSMn)− e(PSM1 + PSM2 + ...+ PSMn)
= ((K1 + e(PRKSM1))IDSM1 + (K2 + e
(PRKSM2))IDSM2 + ...+ (Kn + e
(PRKSMn))IDSMn)− e(PSM1 + PSM2+
...+ PSMn)
= (IDSM1K1 + IDSM2K2 + ...+ IDSMnKn) + e
((PRKSM1)IDSM1 + (PRKSM2)IDSM2
+ ...+ (PRKSMn)IDSMn)− e(PSM1+
PSM2 + ...+ PSMn)
= (IDSM1K1 + IDSM2K2 + ...+ IDSMnKn) + e
(PSM1 + PSM2 + ...+ PSMn)− e(PSM1+
PSM2 + ...+ PSMn)
= IDSM1K1 + IDSM2K2 + ...+ IDSMnKn = Z.
5.2 Defenses Against Various Security Attacks
We assume that an adversary A has a complete knowledge
about the system topology, as well as the identities and
public keys of the entities. A may be an internal entity or
an external entity. A may attempt to launch MITM attacks
on the active connections between any two entities of the SG
network. Since all messages over the network are encrypted,
inherently, the MITM attacks will not be successful. The
replay attacks are also prevented as every message over the
network contains a unique timestamp value. As discussed
in Section 4.3, the proposed protocol also defeats the flood-
based DoS attacks. In addition, the impersonation attacks
can be prevented, since the fake request is discarded and the
connection is terminated.A does not have the actual private
key/shared secret key of the valid entity and cannot decrypt
the transmitted message. The key size of each shared secret
key and public key/private key is chosen to be longer than
128 bits to resist against brute-force attacks. Furthermore,
the Zip codes, sent by the devices, are used to overcome
the redirection attacks. Table 2 shows the comparison of
the security capabilities of the proposed protocol with the
existing protocols. Note that [19] and [20] partially protect
DoS attacks by simply limiting the key agreement sessions.
TABLE 2: Behavior of Attacks in Various Authentication
Protocols
Vulnerabilities [19] [1] [20] Proposed
MITM attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Replay attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Impersonation attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brute-force attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Redirection attacks No No No Yes
Flood-based DoS attacks Partial No Partial Yes
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5.3 Security Analysis
The proposed protocol provides mutual authentications
between the EP and the SM, between the SM and the
GW, and between the SM and the HA. Our protocol also
provides a perfect forward secrecy, since the adversary can
neither retrieve the actual key nor predict any of the fu-
ture keys using any shared secret key. Furthermore, our
protocol preserves the privacy of communicated entities over
the network and overcomes ID thefts, since the transmit-
ted messages are always encrypted. Table 3 shows the
comparison of security requirements. Note that we have
a system with |K|=|C|=|P |, each of 128 bits (with AES-
CTR) or 256 bits (with MAES-CTR) for symmetric encryption
and |K|≥|C|=|P | for asymmetric encryption. Therefore, our
system has perfect secrecy as each key is used with equal
probability 1/|K|, and for every plaintext P and ciphertext
C there is a unique key K such that EK (P) = C. As well,
our system with at least equal size spaces |P |=|C|=|K| is
perfectly key ambiguous as the keys are picked uniformly, and
for all x ∈ P , y ∈ C , there is a unique key K such that y =
EK (x).
Furthermore, A cannot retrieve the partial and actual
private keys of any device. Even in other scenarios where
A extracts any one of these parameters (i) partial private
key, (ii) partial public key, and (iii) public key, or replaces
the public key of the device, our public encryption scheme
is able to defend such attacks, asA cannot retrieve the actual
private key and cannot decrypt the message. Let us consider
two scenarios, in which A tries to extract some information:
Scenario-1: A does not have access to the masterKey,
but may replace public keys (PUK) of the devices with any
value, and also requests the public key of victim device, ex-
tracts the partial private key, and makes decryption queries.
Under this scenario, A has following restrictions:
• A cannot extract the partial private key (PPR) of the
challenge device ID at any point, as the fake ID will
be discarded by the TA.
• A cannot request the private key (PRK) of any iden-
tity, if the respective public key (PUK) has been
replaced.
• A cannot make a decryption query on the challenge
ciphertext C that was generated by a combination of
(ID, PUK).
Scenario-2: A does have access to the masterKey, but
may not replace public keys (PUK) of the devices. A can
compute partial private key of any device, and also can
request public key and make private key extraction and
decryption queries. Under this scenario, A has following
restrictions:
TABLE 3: Summary of Security Requirements Fulfilled by
Various Protocols
Requirements [19] [1] [20] Proposed
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes
Forward secrecy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Privacy preservation No Yes No Yes
Prevents ID thefts No Yes No Yes
• A cannot replace the public key (PUK) of any device
at any time, as the identity and public key reposito-
ries are stored at various trusted authorities (TA).
• A cannot extract the private key (PRK) of the chal-
lenge device at any time, as it is randomly selected
by each device.
• A cannot successfully decrypt the challenge cipher-
text C on behalf of the victim device, as it may
generate partial private key (PPR) of the device, but
does not have the actual private key (PRK) of the
device.
Definition 2. A protocol is secure against adaptive cho-
sen plaintext attack (IND-CPA secure), if no polynomially
bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage. There-
fore, our protocol is secure against IND-CPA.
Our system is secure in terms of indistinguishability as
A cannot identify the message choice because of a unique
combination of P and K for each transmitted message C .
Here, Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-
CPA) is equivalent to the property of semantic security. In our
protocol, symmetric encryption is performed by AES-CTR,
which is IND-CPA secure. Also, the asymmetric encryption,
performed by our proposed scheme, is based on ECC and is
indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA
secure), considering the hardness of the ECDLP [43].
5.4 Performance Analysis
A mutual authentication between the HAN-GW and the
BAN-GW is proposed in [1], a mutual authentication be-
tween the SM and the AS of the DCU-GW is proposed in
[20]. A number of authentication scenarios between SM,
HAN-GW, BAN-GW, NAN-GW, and HA are presented in
[19], whereas our protocol proposes mutual authentications
between EP, SM, HAN-GW, BAN-GW, NAN-GW, and HA.
This subsection computes and compares communication
and computation overheads among these four protocols,
and evaluates total execution time of our proposed protocol.
The total communication overhead (CMO) and the total
computation overhead (CPO) of the protocol for a single au-
thentication token are calculated, respectively, as CMOtotal =
CMOEP−SM + CMOSM−GW + CMOSM−HA and CPOtotal
= CPOEP−SM + CPOSM−GW + CPOSM−HA + CPOkey−gen.
Table 4 shows the comparison of the CMO and CPO of
our protocol with the existing protocols [1], [19], [20]. Out
TABLE 4: Performance with Single Authentication Token
Performance
Parameter
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of these three existing protocols, it is fair to compare our
protocol with only the protocol in [19], as only this protocol
includes most of the involved entities in the SG, while
only two entities are involved in [1] and [20]. Although,
the protocol in [19] and our protocol cover a similar range
of entities, our protocol achieves much lower overhead. In
detail, authentication scenario between the EP-SM generates
CMO of 1024 bits and prevents MITM, replay, imperson-
ation, and redirection attacks. The scenario between the SM-
GW generates 1216 bits of CMO and prevents MITM, replay,
impersonation, repudiation, and flood-based DoS attacks. In
comparison with the protocol in [1], our protocol is also re-
sistant against the flood-based DoS attacks while adding just
24 bits of CMO. Furthermore, in the authentication scenario
between the SM-HA, our protocol prevents MITM, replay,
impersonation, and brute-force attacks while generating 512
bits of CMO.
We also evaluate the performance of our protocol
when there are multiple authentication tokens. We
assume that there are m users executing the protocol
simultaneously and each user has n home appliances. The
CMO generated by the proposed protocol is calculated as
CMO(m,n) = CMO(EP−SM)m + CMO(SM−GW )m
+ CMO(SM−HA)n = 1024m+1216m+512n = 2240m+512n.
The CPO generated by the proposed protocol is calculated
as CPO(m,n) = (5m+2n)E+(5m+2n)D+(3m+n+1)H+(10m+
4n)MAC+1ESUB+4mEMUL+1MUL+mADD+(2m-2)EADD
+4mXOR. Here, E and D represent encryption and
decryption, respectively; XOR is bit-wise exclusive-OR,
MUL and ADD are scalar multiplication and addition over
integers/binaries, respectively; EMUL, EADD, and ESUB
are elliptic curve multiplication, addition and subtraction
(all three are computed as additions), respectively; and
H and MAC are hash and authentication code functions,
respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there are r
malicious users in a batch. The protocol first removes the
invalid requests of the malicious users and then computes
other parameters before further executing the protocol. In
such case, the total recalculated CPO is as CPO(m,n, r)
= CPO(m,n) - rMUL - 2rEMUL - rESUB - 2(r-1)EADD.
Since XOR operations are negligible in comparison with
other operations, they are not included in the calculation of
CPO.
Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively, show the CMO
and CPO generated by the proposed protocol for different
number of users (m = 10, 50, 100) and the number of home
appliances (n = 1, 5, 10, 20), considering unit value for each
operation. In Figure 7, CMO(10, 1) = 2864 and CPO(10, 1)
= 38.75 bytes, CMO(100, 20) = 29280, and CPO(100, 20)
= 397.625 bytes. In Figure 8, CPO(100, 5, 1) = 380 bytes,
CPO(100, 10, 50) = 348.875 bytes, and CPO(100, 20, 99) =
323.375 bytes (worst case). Hence, even if there are some
invalid requests r (Figure 8(b): 1, m/2, and m-1) in a batch,
our protocol efficiently handles them.
5.5 Simulation Result
We simulated our protocol in Java environment with JDK1.7,
2GB RAM, and Windows7 OS. For a single authentication
token, the scalar addition and multiplication operations
over integer/binaries took 0.000933 milliseconds (ms) and
0.00918 ms, single addition and doubling over elliptic curve
took 0.6031 ms and 0.6047 ms, hash function SHA256 took
0.9 ms, HMAC function HMACSHA256 took 271.60 ms,
and [encryption, decryption] time of symmetric MAES-CTR
mode with 256 bits key between EP-SM and SM-HA took
(0.97, 0.78) ms. Moreover, the asymmetric encryption (i)
using RSA with 2048 bits key and (ii) using certificateless
public encryption scheme took (30, 16) ms and (12, 7.6)
ms, respectively. The total computation time by our proto-
col using RSA and using proposed scheme is 4041.91 ms
and 3962.71 ms, respectively. This computation time can
be further reduced by using the fast multiplication, where
a single addition and doubling takes approximately half
of the ordinary ECC multiplication, i.e., 0.303 ms [44]. The
total messages (2752 bits) transmission time on 3G and 4G
networks [45] by our protocol are 0.000451 and 0.000182 ms,
respectively. Hence, the total execution time by our protocol
(with certificateless cipher scheme) on 3G and 4G networks
of approximately 3.96 s is quite reasonable, considering that
it is the total time for completing authentications for all
involved entities in the SG network. Here, we presented just
one case for the overall protocol execution time. However, if
we encrypt the message with AES-CTR/MAES-CTR for the
asymmetric encryption, and the symmetric key is encrypted
by an asymmetric algorithm, the overall time can be further
reduced.
5.6 Formal Proof of the Properties of the Protocol
In order to justify our analysis, we use the BAN-Logic to
provide a formal proof of our scheme. The notations used
in BAN-Logic can be referred from [46].
1) Message Meaning Rule:
(1) EP |≡(EP
SK1↔ SM),EP/E{IDMP ,K1,ZipEP }PUKSM
EP |≡SM |∼E{IDEP ,K1,ZipEP }PUKSM
(2) SM |≡(SM
SK1↔ EP ),SM/E{IDSM ,K2,ZipSM}PUKEP
SM |≡EP |∼E{IDSM ,K2,ZipSM}PUKEP
2) Timestamp Verification Rule:
(1) SMi|≡#(Ti),SMi|≡GW |∼msg1∧msg3SMi|≡GW |≡msg1∧msg3
(2) GW |≡#(Tj),GW |≡SMi|∼msg2SMi|≡GW |≡msg2
3) Jurisdiction Rule:
(1) HA|≡SM⇒TIDHA,HA/HA|∼TIDHAHA|≡SM
Number of home appliances (n)

















Fig. 7: Communication overhead.
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Number of home appliances (n)


















(a) m = 10, 50, 100; n = 1, 5, 10, 20.
Number of home appliances (n)


















(b) m = 10, 50, 100; n = 5, 10, 20; r = 1, m/2, m-1.
Fig. 8: Computation overhead.
(2) SM |≡HA⇒TIDSM ,SM/SM |∼TIDSMSM |≡HA
4) Protocol Goals:
a. Mutual Authentication: EP|≡SM∧EP→SM|≡EP∧SM.
Thus, mutual authentication holds.
b. Session Key Agreement: Each key SK1 between each EP
and the SM provides session key agreement.
c. Freshness of messages: SM |≡#(Tj)∧EP |≡#(Ti). Hence,
freshness of messages between the EP and the SM holds.








The proposed protocol, based on hierarchical cloud trusted
authorities, provides mutual authentications between the
EP and the SM, between the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-
GW/NAN-GW, between the SM and the HA, and between
the NAN-GW and the CC. Particularly, the authentica-
tions between EP-SM and GW-CC, SM-GW, and SM-HA
are, respectively, based on asymmetric key cryptography,
asymmetric key cryptography in batch, and symmetric key
cryptography. Processing requests in batch improves the
efficiency of the system, as a large number of smart meters
communicate with the gateway simultaneously for mutual
authentications. The certificateless scheme in the proposed
protocol maintains privacy preservation as the transmitted
message is always encrypted over the network. Simula-
tion results show that the authentication scenarios between
the EP-SM, the SM-GW, and the SM-HA generate lower
communication and computation overheads in comparison
with existing protocols. Also the overheads generated by
our protocol are manageable, even when invalid requests
exist in a batch. Through security analysis, we show that
our protocol is secure against various existing attacks, such
as MITM attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks,
redirection attacks, and flood-based DoS attacks. In sum,
our protocol is lightweight with low execution time and
efficiently provides a centralized integrated control in a de-
centralized environment. Furthermore, our protocol can be
readily integrated with the cloud computing-based trusted
entities to utilize powerful computing services of the cloud
to efficiently manage the SG system.
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